This paper reports an empirical study of some determinants of "audit delay," i.e., the length of time from a company's fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor's report. Audit delay can affect the timeliness of accounting information releases, and it is well known that timeliness is associated with the market's reaction to the information released. Therefore, research on the determinants of audit delay may improve our understanding of market reactions to accounting releases.
L Introduction
This paper reports an empirical study of some determinants of "audit delay," i.e., the length of time from a company's fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor's report. Audit delay can affect the timeliness of accounting information releases, and it is well known that timeliness is associated with the market's reaction to the information released. Therefore, research on the determinants of audit delay may improve our understanding of market reactions to accounting releases.
To elaborate, the timeliness of information release can affect the level of uncertainty associated with decisions based on the reported information. For example, it has been shown analytically that timeliness can affect a decision maker's action choices and expected payoff (Feltham [1972, chap. 7] ). Moreover, recent empirical studies suggest that timeliness is associated with information used by the market to establish security prices. For example, it has been found that "late" announcements of earnings are associated with lower (often negative) abnormal returns than are "early" announcements (Chambers and Penman [1984] , Givoly and Palmon [1982] , and Kross and Schroeder [1984] ).
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, AUTUMN 1987 The requirement that annual financial statements be subjected to external audit can conflict with the requirement of timely reporting. To the extent that auditing is a time-consuming activity, the release of the earnings announcement and the financial statements will be delayed. While this confiict is perhaps most easily seen in the case of qualified audit opinions,^ unusual events involving auditor-client disagreements are not the only reasons for variable audit lengths. In fact, evidence from corporate controllers suggests that "normal" accounting and auditing problems-involving, e.g., year-end adjustments and slow confirmation returns-are even more important causes of audit delays (Dyer and McHugh [1975] ). Whatever the underlying reasons for audit delays, it has been suggested that the "single most important determinant of the timeliness of the earnings announcement is the length of the audit" (Givoly and Palmon [1982, p. 491] ).
Section 2 reviews prior research on audit delay, while section 3 describes the current study. Section 4 presents the results, including descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables, as well as univariate and multivariate analyses for the overall sample and for four subsamples. Section 5 addresses some generalizability issues raised by the auditor-specific sample of companies we study, while section 6 contains a summary and conclusion.
Prior Research
The univariate relation between audit delay and selected variables has been investigated in six other studies. Company size has been the variable studied most frequently: a negative relation between audit delay and total assets was found in New Zealand by Courtis [1976] and Gilling [1977] , in Australia by Davies and Whittred [1980] , in Canada by Ashton, Graul, and Newton [1987] , and in the United States by Garsombke [1981] . Courtis [1976] and Ashton et al. [1987] also found that financial firms bad shorter delays than firms in other industries. Davies and Whittred [1980] found longer delays for companies with June 30 yearends (the most common year-end date for companies listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange). Similarly, Garsombke [1981] found longer delays for U.S. companies with January through March year-ends. Finally, Whittred [1980] found longer delays for Australian companies receiving qualified audit opinions, and Ashton et al. found longer delays for companies reporting net losses.
Givoly and Palmon [1982] examined the multivariate relation between audit delay and three audit-related variables-company size, operational ' Research has shown that companies receiving qualified opinions report later than companies receiving unqualified opinions (see, e.g., Dodd et al. [1984] and Elliott [1982] ). Audit-related reasons for this phenomenon could include an increase in the scope of the auditing procedures applied in such circumstances, as well as an increase in the amount of auditor-client negotiation time required (Whittred [1980] ). complexity, and internal control quality. Size was expressed as the log of sales, and two measures of complexity were employed-the ratio of inventory to total assets and the average growth rate of sales over a fiveyear period. In their model, only the ratio of inventory to total assets was a significant explanator of audit delay and then only in one year. Overall, the variables explained a modest proportion of the total variance in audit delay across the sample companies: R^ was .26 for 1973 and .19 for 1974, and most of the explanatory power was due to two dummy variables used to control for good and bad news.
The Present Study

SAMPLE
The extent to which audit delay is associated with factors that describe the client and/or the audit was investigated with a larger and more diverse sample of companies, and a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables, than those studied by prior researchers. Our data were collected from questionnaires mailed in May 1982 to managing partners of U.S. offices of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., who were asked to forward the questionnaires to engagement partners responsible for the audits selected. Engagement partners were asked to supply the requested information for the most recently completed audit of that client. After completion, the questionnaires were returned to the executive office.
The sample of engagements was selected from the firm's "Partial List of Clients" as of January 1982. Six industry classifications from this source were chosen for investigation, and 125 clients were randomly selected from each. The industry classifications and the number of usable responses from each are: manufacturing {n = 118), merchandising {n = 89), oil and gas (n = 43), commercial banks {n = 61), savings and loans and mutual savings banks {n = 88), and insurance (n = 89). The total usable sample size was 488 companies. Most of the "nonresponse" was due to clients which-although they appeared in the "Partial List of Clients" as current audit engagements-were actually review, compilation, tax, or consulting engagements, or else were former audit engagements which had not been deleted from this source.
Our use of an auditor-specific sample of companies means we did not have to rely on secondary data sources as previous researchers have done. Moreover, we were able to collect data that are not publicly available on the strength of client internal controls, the work-scheduling practices of the auditors, and other factors described in the following section. Thus, not only is the need to control for auditor characteristics obviated, but we should also have a better chance than previous researchers of finding a systematic relation between the length of the audit and audit-related variables.
On the other hand, because our data are from a single audit firm a high degree of association between our independent variables and audit delay might not be representative of that relation in general, since a single audit firm might be more homogeneous with respect to factors infiuencing audit delay than would a cross-section of audit firms. However, a low degree of association, again assuming greater homogeneity for a single firm, would tend to corroborate the prior studies' findings of a relatively weak relation between audit delay and selected variables. We return to the issue of generalizability in section 5.
VARIABLES
A priori, it appears that several variables are relevant to audit delay, and the prior research provides some support in this regard. We collected data on 14 variables that describe the client, the auditor, and/or some form of "interaction" between client and auditor. These variables, which are described briefiy below, are defined in table 1.
Nine of our independent variables describe the sample companies. The principal size measure employed was total revenue {TOTREV). Dummy variables were used to represent industry classification as "industrial" or "financial" {INDUS), the public/nonpublic status of the companies {PUBLIC), and the month of fiscal year-end {MONTH). The quality of the companies' internal control systems {ICQUAL) was also included as a variable. In addition, data were gathered on four measures of the complexity of the sample companies: the complexity of their operations (OPCOM), their accounting and financial control systems {FINCOM), and their electronic data-processing systems {EDPCOM), as well as the number of separate audit reports issued {REPCOM).
These nine variables primarily reflect characteristics of the company and are taken largely as "fixed" by its auditor. In contrast, the five remaining variables are more closely related to the audit itself, or to some type of interaction or negotiation between the auditor and the company, than to the company per se. The audit-related variables are the relative mix of audit work performed at interim and final dates {INTFIN), which refiects the work-scheduling practices of the auditors, and the number of years of audit experience the firm has with the company {YREXP).T he variables potentially refiecting some type of interaction or negotiation between client and auditor involve profitability measures and the tjrpe of audit opinion issued. Time-consuming negotiation may be related to profitability measures because of disagreement about valuation or
The question related to YREXP had the auditors respond on a six-point scale from "one year" (coded as 1) to "more than five years" (coded as 6). With the benefit of hindsight, we now know this response mode was inadequate to capture the variability in YREXP, since 321 of the 488 responses (65.8%) fell into the "more than five years" category. To assess the impact of this variable on the results, we deleted it from the model in table 5 and found no change in the pattern of the remaining regression coefficients or their significance levels. Therefore, we decided to retain YREXP in the analyses presented in the text. 
INDUS (+)
Industry classification represented by a dummy variable: manufacturing, merchandising, and oil and gas companies ("industrial" subsampie) were assigned a 1, while commercial banks, savings and loans and mutual savings banks, and insurance companies ("financial" subsample) were assigned a 0.
Public/nonpublic classification represented by a dummy variable: companies traded on an orgafiized exchange or over tbe Counter were assigned a 1; otherwise a 0.
Month of fiscal year-end represented by a dummy variable: December year-ends were assigiied a 1; other months a 0.
Overall quality of internal controls, as judged by the auditor and expressed on a five-point scale from "virtually none" (1) to "excellent" (8).
Operational complexity, i.e., number and location of operating units and diversification of product lines, as jutted by the auditor and expressed on a five-point scale from "very simple" (1) to "very complex" (5).
FIMCOM (-H)
Financial complexity, i.e., degree of centralization of accounting and financial control, as judged by the auditor and expressed on a three-point scale from "centralized" (1) to "decentralized" (3).
EDPCOM (+)
Electronic data-processing coinplexity, as judged by the auditor and expressed on a four-point scale from "none" (1) to "complex" (4).
REPCOM (-I-)
Reporting complexity, measured as number of separate reports issued at fiscal year-end, e.g., reports on financial statements of consolidated entity, parent, or subsidiaries; reports on Form lO-K financial statements; and debt compliance letters.
INTFIN (-)
Relative mix of audit work performed at interim and final dates, as judged by the auditor and expressed on a four-point scale from "all work performed subsequent to year-end" (1) to "most work performed prior to year-end" (4).
YREXP (-)
Number of years company has been a client of Peat, Marwick,
Sign of current-year net income represented by a dummy variable: negative net incomes were assigned a 1; otherwise a 0.
NILOTA (-)
Current-year net income or loss divided by total assets.
Type of audit opinion represented by a dummy variable: qualified opinions (excluding consistency exceptions) were assigned a 1; unqualified opinions a 0.
disclosure options, and to the audit opinion because of the potentially negative signal conveyed by a qualified opinion. Dummy variables were used to represent current-year net income as negative or positive {LOSS) and the type of audit opinion as qualified or unqualified {OPIN Mautz [1954, p. 116] ). On the other hand, managements of larger companies may have incentives to reduce audit delay since larger companies may be monitored more closely by investors, unions, and regulatory agencies and therefore face greater external pressure to report earlier (Dyer and McHugh [1975] ). To the extent that earlier reporting is effected through decreased audit delay, a negative relation between company size and A UDELA Y may exist.
A similar argument could apply to companies whose securities are publicly traded, resulting in a negative relation between PUBLIC and AUDELAY. However, to the extent that publicly-traded companies tend to be larger, and assuming a direct relation between size and audit length, a positive relation between PUBLIC and AUDELAY may exist. Finally, with respect to MONTH, either a positive or negative relation with A UDELA Y could exist, depending on the extent to which auditors "work overtime" on clients with December year-ends.
Results
Descriptive statistics and regression results are presented below. For the overall sample, univariate results which focus on the unconditional association between audit delay and each independent variable are followed by multivariate results involving coefficient estimates that are conditional on inclusion of the other variables. Finally, we present similar univariate and multivariate analyses for four subsamples of companies.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in table 2 for the sample of 488 companies, and in table 3 for the industrial/financial and the public/nonpublic subsamples.^ The mean audit delay of 62.5 days is approximately three weeks shorter than those found in Australia (Dyer and McHugh [1975] and Whittred [1980] ) and New Zealand (Courtis [1976] and Gilling [1977] ), but about nine days longer than Garsombke [1981] found in the United States.
Preliminary analyses indicated that values of the dependent variable were skewed substantially to the right, as were values of two independent variables-TOTREV and REPCOM. Therefore, the natural logarithms of these variables were used in the regressions presented below. Significant variability is evident for many of the variables in tables 2 and 3. For example, table 2 shows tbat tbe standard deviation of AUDELAY is about 36 days. In addition, the mean of TOTREV is approximately $200 million, with a standard deviation of more than $1.1 billion. The sample is split about evenly between industrial and financial companies, and 27.3% and 15.8% of companies bave negative net incomes and qualified audit opinions, respectively.
Some differences between the four subsamples and the overall sample can be seen in tables 2 and 3. Relative to tbe financial subsample, the industrial companies have a longer mean audit delay (of 11.3 days) and are somewhat larger in terms of mean total revenue. They are characterized by fewer December year-ends, fewer qualified opinions, fewer negative net incomes, and a smaller mean ratio of net income or loss to total assets. In comparison to the nonpublic subsample, the public companies bave a substantially shorter mean audit delay (of 17.6 days) and are between nine and ten times as large, on average, in terms of revenue. In addition, the public subsample is characterized by fewer qualified opinions, fewer negative net incomes, and a smaller mean ratio of net income or loss to total assets. Moreover, the public companies are more complex, especially with respect to REPCOM, or reporting complexity.
UNIVARIATE RESULTS
Simple regression results for the overall sample in - § J and those receiving qualified audit opinions are associated with greater audit delay. The negative signs for PUBLIC and MONTH indicate that publicly-traded companies and those with December year-ends are associated with less audit delay. The results for the remaining significant variables indicate that less audit delay is associated with better internal controls ilCQUAL), more complex data-processing technology iEDPCOM), and the performance of a greater relative amount of audit work before year-end ilNTFIN).
Although seven variables reach conventional significance levels, only four of them account for more than 1% of the total variance in audit delay-INDUS, PUBLIC, ICQUAL, and INTFIN. The latter two variables, which account for 6.7% and 17.2%, respectively, should be positively related to each other in most situations. That is, auditing firms are likely to do more interim work when internal controls are strong, but more year-end work when controls are weak. This relation is reflected in the simple correlation between ICQUAL and INTFIN of .45 (see table 7 in Appendix A).
To enhance the comparability between our results and those of other univariate studies, table 4 also presents simple regression results for the industrial and financial subsamples, as well as for the public and nonpublic subsamples. Davies and Whittred's [1980] sample was restricted to public industrial and commercial companies (in Australia). Similarly, Courtis's [1976] and Gilling's [1977] samples were composed of public companies (in New Zealand), and Courtis found substantially shorter audit delays for financial companies.
When the overall sample is divided, neither MONTH nor EDPCOM is significant in the financial or industrial subsamples. OPIN loses significance in the industrial subsample, revealing that it is only among the financial companies that qualified opinions result in greater audit delay. Moreover, INTFIN and PUBLIC have substantially more explanatory power for the financial subsample than for the industrial subsample. Internal control quality ilNCQUAL) remains important in both subsamples, and two additional variables-lnREPCOM and YREXPare significant for the industrials. Results for the latter variable show that the longer the company has been a client of the auditor, the shorter is the audit delay.
OPIN, which explains little variance overall, is not significant in either the public or nonpublic subsamples. However, our measure of client size, lnTOTREV, which is not significant for the overall sample, is significant in both subsamples, with opposite signs. This result indicates that larger nonpublic companies are associated with greater audit delay but that larger public companies are associated with shorter audit delay. In addition, public companies that report a net loss for the year have greater audit delays, but no relation exists between LOSS and audit delay for nonpublic companies. Finally, our measure of operational complexity {OPCOM) is significant for the nonpublic subsample but not for the public subsample. Table 5 presents the results from an OLS regression of lnAUDELAY on the set of explanatory variables. For the overall sample, 5 of 14 t values reach conventional levels of statistical significance. All five are significant at the .01 level or better, while none of the remaining t values is significant even at the .10 level.* The coefficients for lnTOTREV and OPCOM have positive signs, while those for PUBLIC, ICQUAL, and INTFIN have negative signs. The adjusted R^ is .265 for the overall sample, indicating that about one-fourth of the total variance in audit delay is explained by this set of 14 variables.T o enhance the comparability between our results and those of Givoly and Palmon [1982] , who reported multivariate analyses for public industrial companies, table 5 also presents multiple regression results for the industrial and financial subsamples and for the public and nonpublic subsamples. The five variables significant for the overall sample are also significant for the industrial/financial split, in at least one of the two subsamples, although PUBLIC loses significance in the industrial subsample, as does OPCOM in the financial subsample. The adjusted R^ for the financial subsample (.310) exceeds that for the industrial subsample (.151). A comparison of the regression equations (Chow [I960] ) for the two subsamples suggests rejection of the null hypothesis that the two equations do not differ {F = 2.33; p < .05).
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
The variables significant for the overall sample are also significant for the public/nonpublic split, in at least one of the two subsamples. (Only INTFIN is significant in both.) Moreover, no additional variable is significant for either subsample. Three variables that are significant for the overall sample lose significance in the public subsample {lnTOTREV, ICQUAL, and OPCOM). The adjusted R^ is greater for the public subsample (.388) than for the nonpublic subsample (.220), and a Chow test again suggests rejection of the null hypothesis that the respective regression equations do not differ {F = 1.93; p < .05).
''To develop a more parsimonious model of audit delay for the overall sample, the coefficients were reestimated by including in the model only the five significant variables. The results, not reported here, indicate that no explanatory power is lost by including only 5 instead of 14 variables. All five variables retain significance at the .01 level, and the adjusted R' remains .265. Similar results obtain when the sample is split into financial/ industrial subsamples. When the subsample of public firms is reestimated using the one variable found to be significant, the adjusted R'' decreases from .388 to .339.
A moderate degree of multicollinearity was present among the 14 explanatory variables, the possible effects of which are examined in Appendix A.
•I 
II
Generalizability of Results
We address the issue of generalizability by comparing our univariate results with univariate results reported in other studies that did not use auditor-specific samples, and by summarizing the differences in audit delay that other studies have found among the Big Eight and between Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms.
Seven other studies have examined the relation between audit delay and at least one of our independent variables for samples of public companies. The directional results of the univariate analyses reported in those studies are shown in table 6, along with comparable results from our subsample of public companies. All studies which have examined measures of size, industry, and net loss have reported results consistent with ours: there are shorter audit delays for larger companies and greater delays for industrial companies and for companies reporting a net loss in the current year.
The results are largely consistent for the OPIN variable, i.e., in five of seven comparisons qualified opinions are associated with greater audit delays. The results for the remaining variable, MONTH, are more difficult to interpret. Eight of 13 comparisons show that audit delays are greater during the "busy season," while our own results show the opposite. We point out, however, that the four studies which have included "busy season" as a variable have defined it in four different ways-making cross-study comparisons difficult at best.
Four studies provide some indication of differences in audit delay among the Big Eight and between Big Eight and smaller firms. Ashton et al. [1987] , Davies and Whittred [1980], and Gilling [1977] all found shorter audit delays for Big Eight than for non-Big Eight firms, while Garsombke [1981] found no significant differences in audit delays among the Big Eight.
In summary, these comparisons suggest that the associations we find between audit delay and our independent variables are not simply reflections of one firm's approach to audits in one year. Although audit delays tend to be shorter for Big Eight firms, the consistency between our results and those of other studies-at least so far as public companies are concerned^suggests that at least a portion of our results is generalizable to other samples.
Summary and Conclusion
This study has examined audit delay using 14 variables which describe the companies, their auditor, and various types of interaction between these two parties. Univariate analyses for the overall sample showed that audit delay is significantly longer for companies that (1) receive qualified audit opinions, (2) are in the industrial as opposed to financial industry classification, (3) are not publicly traded, (4) have a fiscal year-end other .i-s than December, (5) have poorer internal controls, (6) employ less complex data-processing technology, and (7) have a greater relative amount of audit work performed after year-end.
Our univariate results also reveal that the relation between audit delay and several explanatory variables is conditional on whether the company is public or nonpublic, and on whether it is an industrial or a financial company. For example, our analysis of the industrial/financial subsamples indicates that it is only among financial companies that qualified opinions are associated with greater audit delays, and that the longer an industrial company has been a client of the auditor, the shorter is the audit delay. Similarly, our analysis of the public/nonpublic subsamples shows that company size is negatively related to audit delay for public companies hut positively related to audit delay for nonpublic companies. We also find that it is only among public companies that a net loss for the year is associated with greater audit delay.
In the multivariate analyses, five variables reach conventional significance levels for the overall sample, and the model explains 26.5% of the cross-sectional variability in audit delay. No loss of explanatory power occurs when the remaining nine variables are excluded and the coefficients of the five significant variables are reestimated. Similarly, little or no loss of explanatory power occurs when more parsimonious models of audit delay are developed for the four subsamples of companies. The multivariate analyses indicate, however, that substantially more of the variability in audit delay is explained for the public and financial companies than for the nonpublic and industrial companies, respectively.
It is possible that additional variables that more closely reflect the production of the audit (instead of company attributes) would explain more of the cross-sectional variability in audit delay. It is also possible that greater explanatory power could result from examining year-to-year changes in audit delay as a function of changes in the independent variables. Although many of the variables we exaniine are not likely to change substantially from one year to the next (e.g., ICQUAL, OPCOM, and FINCOM), others are likely to change (e.g., TOTREV, REPCOM, and NILOTA). Changes in these variables, and especially in variables such as LOSS and OPIN, could be strongly associated with changes in audit delay.
APPENDIX A
Examination of Multicollinearity
Since some of the simple correlation coefficients between pairs of explanatory variables were greater than .50, we examined the possible effects of multicollinearity. A correlation matrix is shown in table 7. First, several rules of thumb often suggested for judging the potential severity of multicollinearity problems suggested that such problems are i not severe for our sample. For example, it is not the case that the overall F for the regression results in table 5 is significant at .05 but none of the t statistics for the explanatory variables is significant at that level (Kmenta [1971] ). Moreover, the squares of the partial correlations for the explanatory variables are not low relative to the overall R^ of the model (Maddala [1977] ). As a further check on the possible effects of multicoUinearity, several individual variables and combinations of variables were deleted from the model shown in table 5 to determine the extent to which the signs, relative sizes, and significance levels of the coefficients of the remaining variables would change. Specifically, variables having simple correlation coefficients greater than .50 with other variables were deleted {lnTOTREV, PUBLIC, OPCOM, EDPCOM, and lnREPCOM), as were selected combinations of these variables. The choice of .50 was based on a rule of thumb suggested by Klein [1962] . He suggested that multicollinearity is not necessarily a problem unless the intercorrelation of explanatory variables is "high" relative to the overall multiple correlation coefficient. In the present case, given an J?^ of .265, one suggested "cutoff value for pairs of correlations might be V.265 = .515.
The results, not reported here, suggest that the multicoUinearity present in our data should not create problems in interpreting the regression results. For example, all variables that are significant for the model reported in table 5 remain significant when other variables are deleted. Only one additional variable reaches significance, and then in only 1 of the 12 alternative models we tested. Sign changes occur in only 8 (of 149) instances, and in all cases involve nonsignificant variables. Moreover, the relative sizes and significance levels of the regression coefficients are stable across models, and the adjusted R% change very little.
